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COMBINATORIAL GROUP THEORY AND PUBLIC KEY
CRYPTOGRAPHY
VLADIMIR SHPILRAIN AND GABRIEL ZAPATA
Abstract. After some excitement generated by recently suggested public key ex-
change protocols due to Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld and Ko-Lee et al., it is a prevalent
opinion now that the conjugacy search problem is unlikely to provide sufficient level
of security if a braid group is used as the platform. In this paper we address the
following questions: (1) whether choosing a different group, or a class of groups,
can remedy the situation; (2) whether some other “hard” problem from combinato-
rial group theory can be used, instead of the conjugacy search problem, in a public
key exchange protocol. Another question that we address here, although somewhat
vague, is likely to become a focus of the future research in public key cryptography
based on symbolic computation: (3) whether one can efficiently disguise an element
of a given group (or a semigroup) by using defining relations.
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1. Introduction
One of the possible generalizations of the discrete logarithm problem to arbitrary
groups is the so-called conjugacy search problem: given two elements a, b of a group
G and the information that ax = b for some x ∈ G, find at least one particular
element x like that. Here ax stands for xax−1. The (alleged) computational difficulty
of this problem in some particular groups (namely, in braid groups) has been used
in several group based cryptosystems, most notably in [1] and [13]. However, after
some initial excitement (which has even resulted in naming a new area of “braid group
cryptography” — see [3], [4]), it seems now that the conjugacy search problem in a
braid group cannot provide sufficient level of security; see [18] for explanations.
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Therefore, one faces the following two natural questions:
Question 1. Is there a group, or a class of groups, where the public key exchange
protocol suggested in [1] would be secure enough to be used in real-life applications?
Question 2. Is there another “hard” problem in combinatorial group theory that can
be used, instead of the conjugacy search problem, in a public key exchange protocol?
Without a positive answer to at least one of these questions, it is unlikely that
combinatorial group theory will have a significant impact on public key cryptography,
which is now dominated by methods and ideas from number theory.
We point out one more question, which has not been getting sufficient attention so
far, but is likely to become a focus of the future research in public key cryptography
based on symbolic computation:
Question 3. Can one efficiently disguise an element of a given group (or a semigroup)
by using defining relations?
Disguising an element before transmission is sometimes called “diffusion” — see e.g.
[6]. The importance of this is rather obvious: if, for example, one transmits a conjugate
xax−1 of a public element a “as is”, i.e., without diffusion, then the opponent can
determine the private element x just by inspection. Similar problem arises in any other
public key exchange protocol. In protocols based on ideas from number theory, the
diffusion is usually provided “automatically”, due to various properties of the decimal
or other numerical system that is used. For instance, in the product 7· 3=21, the factors
7 and 3 cannot be determined just by inspection; this is provided simply by the way we
multiply integers in the decimal system, or, equivalently, by the existence of a simple
“normal form” for integers.
In abstract groups, we usually do not have this facility. In fact, in an abstract group
(or a semigroup), the result of multiplication is simply concatenation: a ·b = ab, i.e., an
extra effort is always required to disguise factors in a product. This is why a diffusion
mechanism is of paramount importance in any public key exchange protocol based on
symbolic computation.
We note here that recent work of Myasnikov and Ushakov [16] makes it appear likely
that, speaking somewhat informally, in a “generic” group, the amount of work needed
to disguise a “generic” element by using defining relations is about the same as needed
to recover an element from its disguised form. This, of course, is unacceptable in
cryptographic applications. It seems that the difficulty in disguising an element of a
group (or a semigroup) by using defining relations might be a major obstacle for using
symbolic computation in public key cryptography, and the problem of diffusion will
therefore take the center stage in future research.
In this paper, we contribute toward a solution of this problem in Section 7 by breaking
down defining relations of a group into “small pieces”. More formally, we replace a given
group by an isomorphic group where all relators have length at most 3. Intuitively,
diffusion should be easier to achieve in groups with shorter defining relations, so we
hope that our idea can be useful.
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As far as other questions are concerned, we have to say up front that, in our opinion,
Question 1 has a smaller chance for a positive answer, and it is unlikely that the
conjugacy search problem will be used in real-life implementations. Nevertheless, we
study Question 1 here in Section 6 by exploring the idea of using random groups from a
sufficiently large class of groups instead of a single group. Technically, braid groups, too,
are a class of groups, but this class is too narrow in the sense that, informally speaking,
any (meaningful) algorithm that works for a particular group Bn, n ≥ 5, would also
work for Bm for any m ≥ 5. We may call such a class of groups “algorithmically
homogeneous”. Here we draw attention to a more diverse class of small cancellation
groups that satisfy small cancellation conditions C(4), T (4), but not C ′(1
6
) (see [14]).
The latter is needed to try to avoid hyperbolic groups (all finitely presented C ′(1
6
)
groups are hyperbolic), where the conjugacy search problem can be solved very quickly
(see [10] and [11] for discussion).
In the class of groups with small cancellation conditions C(4) and T (4), the word
problem is solvable in quadratic time (see [14, Theorem V.6.3]), which meets the neces-
sary condition for an efficient common key extraction by authorized parties. We note in
passing that the existence of a unique normal form for elements of a particular group
G is not necessary for common key extraction, as observed in [1]. If Alice and Bob
have arrived at a point where Alice has an element, say, u, and Bob has an element v
such that u = v in G, then they can establish a common key as follows. Alice chooses,
privately, a finite binary sequence b1, b2, ..., which is going to be her common secret key
with Bob. She then transmits a sequence of group elements u1, u2, ... such that ui = u
in G if and only if bi = 1. Bob recovers the sequence b1, b2, ... by comparing u1, u2, ...
to his v.
We note that there is no known polynomial time algorithm for solving the conjugacy
search problem in an arbitrary group with small cancellation conditions C(4) and T (4).
In Section 2, we consider a different problem from combinatorial group theory that
can be used in a public key exchange protocol. This is yet another generalization of the
discrete logarithm problem. Given a group G with the semigroup of endomorphisms
End G, suppose there are two subsemigroups, A ⊆ End G and B ⊆ End G, such that
for any α ∈ A and β ∈ B, one has αβ = βα. Let w ∈ G be a public element. Then
the key exchange protocol is quite standard: Alice chooses, privately, some α ∈ A and
sends α(w) to Bob. Bob chooses some β ∈ B and sends β(w) to Alice. Since αβ = βα,
both end up with a common private key α(β(w)) = β(α(w)).
The point is, of course, in selecting a platform groupG and semigroupsA,B ⊆ End G
wisely, so that the corresponding key exchange protocol is both secure and efficient.
One special case of such arrangement appears in [13], where G is a braid group Bn, and
A,B consist of inner automorphisms (i.e., conjugations). This arrangement however
makes the cryptosystem vulnerable to so-called “length based” attacks (see e.g. [5], [7],
[9]) because applying a generic automorphism to a generic element of a group tends to
increase the length of (the normal form of) this element. To avoid attacks of this kind,
we suggest here using non-injective endomorphisms; the effect of such an endomorphism
on the length of an element is no longer predictable.
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Again, in Section 4, we suggest using a large class of groups instead of a fixed group
and selecting a random group from this class every time one wants to initiate a public
key exchange protocol. A particular class of groups that we consider here is the class
of Artin groups of extra large type. Groups in this class are known to be automatic
[17], which implies, in particular, that the word problem in any group from this class
is solvable in quadratic time. Further details are given in Section 5.
Finally, we note that, as a further generalization, one can use arbitrary well-defined
mappings α, β (not necessarily endomorphisms) of a group G in the above context. A
simple example of that kind was given in [12]; see also our Section 2.
2. Algebraic public-key cryptographic systems
The central requirement for an operational public-key cryptographic system (PKC)
is a one-way function; in theory, it is the security core in the development and imple-
mentation of public-key cryptographic protocols. Let S and T be two sets. In essence,
a one-way function is a feasibly computable function f : S → T such that given the
image y = f(x), it is computationally infeasible to determine a preimage x ∈ S.
For an algebraic characterization of a one-way function, we assume S and T to be
associative algebraic structures with a single binary operation, e.g., semigroups. We
call these structures platforms when used in the context of cryptography.
Let the pair 〈X;R〉 be a presentation of a semigroup S, where X = {x1, x2, . . .} is a
set of generators of S and R = {r1 = r
′
1, r2 = r
′
2, . . .} a set of defining relations. The
full transformation semigroup of S, denoted by TS , is the set of all functions S → S
closed under composition, see e.g. [8]. A function t ∈ TS is well-defined in S if for any
w,w′ ∈ S such that w = w′, one has t(w) = t(w′).
The set of well-defined functions from TS can be utilized to deliver diffusion in S,
i.e., to dissemble an element of the platform S before transmission by using its defining
relations. If a subset T ⊆ TS consisting of well-defined functions acts on S, say,
f : S × T −→ S described by f : (w, t) 7−→ t(w),
such that recovering w from t(w) = f(w, t) is computationally infeasible, then the
action f satisfies the principal requirement of a one-way function.
A particular example of such a subset T ⊆ TS would be EndS, the set (which is
actually a monoid) of endomorphisms of S. Let G be an arbitrary semigroup and let
ρ : G→ EndS be a morphism. Then ρ determines an action of S by its image (denoted
by Imρ), i.e., g 7→ (t 7→ t(w)), for g ∈ G and t ∈ EndS. The function
f : S × T −→ S given by (w, t) 7−→ t(w) = w′
explicitly defines the action, where T = Imρ. If the search for a t ∈ T such that
f(w, t) = w′ is computationally infeasible, then the action f is an intrinsic one-way
function inherited by S via a semigroup T .
Therefore, an algebraic characterization of a one-way function can be determined
through an action, as specified above, by algebraic properties of S and T . Without loss
of generality, given feasibly computable algebraic structures S and T , if there exists an
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action f : S × T → S such that f is a one-way, well-defined function for fixed values of
T , then the elements of S can be manipulated for public-key encryption.
Definition 1. An algebraic public-key cryptographic system is a tuple (S, T, f ; H, h),
satisfying the following properties:
• S and T are feasibly computable algebraic structures (e.g. semigroups).
• f : S × T → S is an action that is one-way and well-defined for fixed values of
T : given a private t ∈ T and any public w ∈ S, it is infeasible to determine t
from f(w, t), and for any w′ ∈ S such that w′ = w, one has f(w′, t) = f(w, t).
• H is a set of auxiliary feasibly computable algebraic structures defined for specific
protocols (i.e. key exchange, decryption, etc).
• h : X × Y → X is an auxiliary action (defined for specific protocols), where X
and Y are one of the algebraic structures S, T , or H ∈ H.
Let us now assume S to be a feasibly computable group G. With the developed
analysis, we interpret the standard theory of PKC as arising from a permutation rep-
resentation ρ : G → SG, where SG ⊆ TG is the symmetric group of G, such that
ρ : x 7→ x ρ and Imρ is a subgroup of the group of automorphisms of G, denoted by
AutG. Since the elements x ρ ∈ Imρ are automorphisms, x ρ acts by permuting words
g ∈ G with the capability of providing cryptographic confusion and diffusion (see e.g.
[6]).
If for every x ρ ∈ Imρ the recovery of g from g ′ = x ρ(g) is infeasible, then the
representation ρ determines a one-way function; namely, the group action
f : G×N −→ G defined by (g, x ρ) 7−→ x ρ(g) = g ′ ,
where N is a subgroup of AutG. Given g ′ = f(g, x ρ), it should be noted that it suffices
to “search” for (xρ)−1 in AutG to determine g ∈ G; this establishes an automorphism
search problem for G.
Definition 2. Let F (X) be the free group with basis X and let 〈X;R〉 be a presentation
of G.
• Given an arbitrary word g ∈ G, the word problem (WP) is the algorithmic
problem of deciding whether or not g = 1.
• Given a word g ∈ G such that g = 1, the word search problem (WSP) is the
algorithmic problem of “searching” for an explicit expression of g as a product
u1 r
ǫ1
1 u
−1
1 · · · ut r
ǫt
t u
−1
t = g, where ui ∈ F (X), ri ∈ R, and ǫi ∈ {±1 }.
• Two words g, h ∈ G are conjugate if there is an x ∈ G such that xgx−1 = h.
The algorithmic problem of deciding whether or not two arbitrary words g, h ∈ G
are conjugate is the the conjugacy problem (CP).
• Given two conjugate words g, h ∈ G, the conjugacy search problem (CSP) is the
algorithmic problem of “searching” for an x ∈ G satisfying xgx−1 = h.
Example 1. The braid group on n strands, denoted by Bn, with presentation
Bn = 〈σ1, . . . , σn−1 ; σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1, σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2 〉 ,
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has the word problem solvable in quadratic time. The braid group Bn is a suggested
group-theoretic platform for the implementation of the conjugacy search problem, see
[1], [13].
We note that the group AutBn is equal to 〈 InnBn, η 〉, where InnBn is the group
of inner automorphisms of Bn and η : σ 7→ σ
−1, for any σ ∈ Bn. Thus, the general au-
tomorphism search problem for Bn basically reduces to the inner-automorphism search
problem for Bn, i.e., to the conjugacy search problem for braid groups.
3. Commuting Action Key Exchange (CAKE)
To change the standard methodology of working implicitly just with the automor-
phism group of G, we generalize an action f : G × AutG → G, using Definition 1, to
a well-defined action on an algebraic structure S by an algebraic structure N for fixed
values of N . To manifest the advantage of the abstraction, we construct an algebraic
PKC for the implementation of a key exchange protocol based on a generalization of
the discrete logarithm problem:
Definition 3 (Commuting Action Key Exchange, CAKE). Select the platforms S and
T to establish an algebraic PKC tuple (S, T, f ; H), where the auxiliary set H is {A,B ⊆
T | ∀α ∈ A ∀β ∈ B αβ = β α }. The key exchange protocol is set for two entities,
Alice and Bob.
Protocol:
(1) The semigroup S, a word w ∈ S, and a generating set for each semigroup in H
are made public.
(2) Alice chooses a private word α ∈ A satisfying f(w,α) 6= 1 and transmits
f(w,α) = wα to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a private word β ∈ B satisfying f(w, β) 6= 1 and transmits
f(w, β) = wβ to Alice.
(4) Alice computes f(wβ,α) = w βα and Bob computes f(wα, β) = wαβ. Both
entities establish wαβ = wβα as the common secret key.
Example 2. The Diffie-Hellman protocol becomes an instance of the CAKE proto-
col if the multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime number and its standard
automorphism group are the chosen platforms.
A simple, well-studied associative algebraic system S with a single binary operation
and a commutative semigroup T ⊆ EndS generated by a large set of elements are good
potential candidates for the implementation of CAKE. In this case, both α and β are
endomorphisms of S, and α(β(w)) = β(α(w)) becomes the common key. Similarly, one
can also use a commutative subsemigroup T of the full transformation semigroup TS
containing well-defined functions α, β (not necessarily endomorphisms) of S. A basic
example of that kind was given in [12].
Example 3. Let A,B ⊆ S be two subsemigroups of a semigroup S such that ab = ba
for any a ∈ A, b ∈ B. Given a public element w ∈ S, Alice computes w 7→ a1wa2,
where a1, a2 ∈ A are her private elements, and transmits this new element to Bob (after
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disguising it somehow). Similarly, Bob transmits w 7→ b1wb2, where b1, b2 ∈ B are his
private elements. The common key now is a1b1wb2a2 = b1a1wa2b2.
Note that if A,B ⊆ S are groups, the protocol of Ko, Lee et. al. [13] can also be
obtained as a special case of the above protocol where a2 = a
−1
1 and b2 = b
−1
1 .
4. Classes of groups vs. particular groups
Let B be the class of braid groups. A generic element Bn from this class can be
chosen from B simply by randomly selecting a natural number for the variable n. For
general applications, once a choice for a braid group Bn is made, an algorithm that
applies to this group also applies to other braid groups. Informally speaking, the braid
groups are “algorithmically homogeneous” and this can be a drawback for cryptographic
applications, as stated in the Introduction. In the following sections, we address this
issue by considering wider classes of groups.
In particular, we introduce additional randomness to an algebraic PKC protocol,
requiring that its platforms be selected at random from a wider class of groups at the
beginning of the generation of keys. Moreover, isomorphic groups from a wider class
provide a mechanism for diffusion, as examined in the last section of the paper. The use
of isomorphic groups and random selections from a class of groups is a familiar scenario
for cryptosystems; both in the RSA and in the discrete logarithm cryptosystems, primes
are randomly selected for application, i.e., a multiplicative group of integers and a
subgroup of its automorphism group are randomly selected.
To exemplify these ideas, we first consider the class of Artin groups of extra large
type for the implementation of the Commuting Action Key Exchange protocol, via
endomorphisms. Second, despite our belief that Question 1 in the Introduction is likely
to have a negative answer, we give the conjugacy search problem (CSP) a benefit of
the doubt; we consider the class of groups satisfying small cancellation conditions C(4)
and T (4), but not C ′(1
6
) (to try to avoid hyperbolic groups), for the implementation of
a cryptosystem relying on CSP. Furthermore, these classes of groups offer additional
properties that can be utilized in other algebraic PKC protocols.
5. The class of Artin groups of extra large type
Let GΓ be a group with presentation
GΓ = 〈 g1, . . . , gn ; r(gi, gj) = 1 (for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j) 〉 ,
where n ≥ 2 and r(gi, gj) = 1 is a relator involving two generators. Given GΓ there is
an associated labeled graph Γ and vice versa. The vertices of the graph Γ are labeled
by the generators of GΓ. Any two vertices gi, gj ∈ Γ are connected by an edge if there
is a relation r(gi, gj) ∈ GΓ between the corresponding generators; in other words, edges
are labeled by relations.
Example 4. An Artin group AΓ is a group with presentation
AΓ = 〈 a1, . . . , an ; µij = µji for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n) 〉 , where µij = ai aj ai . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
mij
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and mij = mji. Artin groups arise as generalizations of braid groups, see e.g. [2]. For
an Artin group AΓ, the associated labeled graph Γ has no multiple edges or loops. The
vertices ai of Γ are the generators of the Artin group. Any two vertices ai, aj ∈ Γ are
connected by an edge, labeled with the integer mij , associated to the relation µij = µji
(between the corresponding generators ai, aj ∈ AΓ).
In general, automorphisms (or endomorphisms) of the graph Γ induce automor-
phisms (or endomorphisms) of the group GΓ. Therefore, the graph associated to GΓ
gives us a direct procedure for the construction of a semigroup T ⊆ EndGΓ that can
contain a large pool of commuting elements. This is a necessary condition for common
key extraction by legitimate parties in the application of the Commuting Action Key
Exchange protocol (CAKE, Definition 3). To construct the corresponding semigroup
T with sufficiently many endomorphisms, a graph Γ can be chosen to be a tree. The
procedure implemented for the Ko-Lee protocol can then be utilized to provide for
commuting endomorphisms, i.e., one splits the vertices of the graph into two disjoint
sets such that each of the entities, Alice and Bob, select endomorphisms which act on
their own set.
Example 5. The relations of the braid groups Bn involve two generators. The corre-
sponding graph associated to Bn is just a simple path, and it has only one automor-
phism that induces the following automorphism of Bn: σi 7→ σn−i, which happens to
be an inner automorphism of Bn. For other GΓ groups, however, their corresponding
graphs are more complex, and it is easy to arrange for a large semigroup (or a group)
T ⊆ EndGΓ of endomorphisms (or automorphisms).
Artin groups AΓ with the property that all the integers mij ≥ 4 are called Artin
groups of extra large type. A tree Γ can be associated to an Artin group of extra
large type, providing a direct procedure for constructing a semigroup T ⊆ EndAΓ.
Moreover, Artin groups of extra large type are automatic [17], thus the word problem
for groups in this class can be solved in quadratic time, and by a result of [11], the
word problem is solvable in linear time on average. Therefore, we can suggest the class
of Artin groups of extra large type as platforms for CAKE.
5.1. Key exchange protocol based on Artin groups. In this section we present
the class of Artin groups of extra large type as an implementable class for CAKE.
Key generation: Randomly select a finite rooted tree Γ with l levels such that the
degree of the root is equal to 2, and the degrees of all other vertices are between 2 and
an integer m, with the exception of the end vertices whose degrees are 1. Associate to
the tree Γ an Artin group AΓ of extra large type by labelling each vertex of Γ with a
letter ai and numbering an edge by a (random) mij ≥ 4 if there are two corresponding
vertices ai and aj incident to this edge.
Let ak be the root of the tree and let Γ0 = Γ − ak be the subgraph obtained by
deleting the root ak. The graph Γ0 consists of two finite disjoint subtrees, say, ΓA and
ΓB, that are spliced by the root ak. The associated subgroups are AΓA and AΓB .
The sets of graph endomorphisms of ΓA and ΓB induce the submonoid of endo-
morphisms EndAΓA × EndAΓB ⊆ EndAΓ such that for any α ∈ EndAΓA and
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β ∈ EndAΓB both α and β commute: αβ = β α. In order for both submonoids
to act non-trivially on a public word w ∈ AΓ, the word must involve some generat-
ing elements a1, . . . , ap ∈ AΓA and some generating elements b1, . . . , bq ∈ AΓB , i.e.,
w = w(a1, . . . , ap, b1, . . . , bq).
CAKE for Artin groups of extra large type. Choose a random Artin group
AΓ of extra large type to be the platform S for the CAKE tuple (S, T, f ; H), and
let T = EndAΓA × EndAΓB . Define H to be the set {EndAΓA, EndAΓB}. The
protocol is set for Alice and Bob.
Protocol:
(1) The random group AΓ, a word w = w(a1, . . . , ap, b1, . . . , bq) ∈ AΓ and a gener-
ating set for each element of H are made public.
(2) Alice chooses a private word α ∈ EndAΓA and transmits f(w,α) = w
α to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a private word β ∈ EndAΓB and transmits f(w, β) = w
β to Alice.
(4) Alice computes f(w β, α) = w β α and Bob computes f(w α, β) = w αβ . Alice
and Bob set
w αβ = w β α
as their common secret key.
Remark. By introducing randomness in the selection of the group AΓ, we make the
present approach dynamic. The class of Artin groups of extra large type seems to be
less “algorithmically homogeneous” than, say, the class of braid groups. In general,
algorithmic non-homogeneity can disrupt general algorithmic methods an opponent
might obtain for the purpose of acquiring a private key. For example, a typical endo-
morphism (non-automorphism) for AΓ would be merging two terminal children vertices
of the same parent, “confusing” the length of the word w. As a result, the effect of
such an endomorphism on the length of a generic element of the group is no longer
predictable, placing length attacks in question.
6. A class of small cancellation groups
In this section, we follow Lyndon and Schupp [14]. For facts about small cancellation
theory the reader is referred to this source for further reading. Let F (X) be the free
group with a basis X = {xi | i ∈ I }, where I is an indexing set. Let ǫk ∈ {±1}, where
1 ≤ k ≤ n. A word w(x1, . . . , xn) = x
ǫ1
i1
xǫ2i2 · · · x
ǫn
in
in F (X), with all xik not necessarily
distinct, is a reduced X-word if xǫkik 6= x
− ǫk+1
ik+1
, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. In addition, the word
w(x1, . . . , xn) is cyclically reduced if it is a reduced X-word and x
ǫ1
i1
6= x− ǫnin . A set
R containing cyclically reduced words from F (X) is symmetrized if it is closed under
cyclic permutations and taking inverses.
Let G be a group with presentation 〈X;R〉. A non-empty word u ∈ F (X) is called a
piece if there are two distinct relators r1, r2 ∈ R of G such that r1 = uv1 and r2 = uv2.
The group G belongs to the class C(p) if no element of R is a product of fewer than p
pieces. Also, the group G belongs to the class C ′(λ) if for every r ∈ R such that r = uv
and u is a piece, one has |u| < λ|r|.
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In particular, if G belongs to the class C ′(1
6
), then Dehn’s algorithm solves the word
problem for G. Thus, if G is a finitely presented group from the class C ′(1
6
), then it is
hyperbolic.
Example 6. Let 〈x1, x2, x3 ; x
2
1x2x
2
3x
−1
2 = 1, x
2
2x3x
2
1x
−1
3 = 1 〉 be a presentation of a
group G. Now, x±21 , x
±1
2 , x
±2
2 , x
±1
3 , x
±2
3 , (x2x3)
±1 and (x2x
−1
3 )
±1 are the pieces of G,
and every relator is a product of four of these pieces. Therefore, the group G is in the
class of C(4) groups. However, G is not in the class of C ′(1
6
); for i = 1, 2 and 3, the
pieces x±1i , satisfy the property |x
±1
i | =
1
6
|x1x2x3x
2
4x
−1
2 | and |x
±1
i | =
1
6
|x22x3x1x4x
−1
3 |.
The solution of the conjugacy problem (CP) is irrelevant for the implementation of
a cryptographic protocol utilizing the computational difficulty of the conjugacy search
problem (CSP). However, reasonable evidence of a potentially computationally hard
CSP is provided if there is no known polynomial time algorithm for CP.
For a class of small cancellation groups possessing the property of “no known poly-
nomial time algorithm for CP”, we need one more condition. A group G with finite
presentation 〈X;R〉 belongs to the class T (q) for a natural number q if for any se-
quence r1, . . . , rn ∈ R, with 3 ≤ n < q and ri 6= r
−1
i+1, at least one of the products
r1r2, . . . , rn−1rn, rnr1 is cyclically reduced without cancellation.
A group G with presentation 〈X |R 〉 is said to be a small cancellation group of type
C(p)-T (q) if it belongs to the classes C(p) and T (q). By Theorem V.6.3 of [14], the
word problem is solvable in the class of small cancellation groups of type C(4)-T (4).
If hyperbolic groups C ′(1
6
) are avoided, then, generally, there is no known polynomial
time algorithm for solving the conjugacy search problem for groups in this class (even
though the conjugacy problem is solvable by [14, Theorem V.7.6]).
Thus, in this class, legitimate entities can choose a random group and implement an
algebraic PKC protocol, e.g. CAKE, that relies on the hardness of the conjugacy search
problem or a harder problem that can potentially arise (as we indicated in Sections 2
and 3).
Example 7. Consider the presentation 〈x1, x2, x3 ; x
2
1x2x
2
3x
−1
2 , x
2
2x3x
2
1x
−1
3 〉 for G, the
group of Example 6. For any r1, r2 and r3, no two of which are inverse of one another,
from the symmetrized set {x21x2x
2
3x
−1
2 , x
2
2x3x
2
1x
−1
3 }, no cancellation is possible in at
least one of the words r1r2, r2r3 and r3r1. Therefore, G belongs to the class of T (4)
and C(4) groups, but not the class of C ′(1
6
) groups.
7. Diffusion
In this section, we offer a method that can, in our opinion, substantially enhance the
“diffusion”, i.e., the process of disguising an element of a given group by using defining
relations. This method is not brand new, but it was used before in a different context,
namely, in attempts to attack the Andrews-Curtis conjecture, a notoriously difficult
problem in low-dimensional topology and combinatorial group theory (see e.g. [15]).
The idea is to break down defining relations of a group into “small pieces”. More
formally, we replace a given group G by an isomorphic group where all relators have
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length at most 3. Intuitively, diffusion should be easier to achieve in groups with shorter
defining relations, so we hope that our idea is useful.
The procedure itself is quite simple. Let G have a presentation 〈x1, ..., xn; r1, ..., rk〉
in terms of generators x1, ..., xn and defining relations r1, ..., rk. We are going to obtain
a different presentation for G by using Tietze transformations (see e.g. [14]); these are
elementary isomorphism-preserving operations on presentations of groups.
Specifically, let, say, r1 = xixju, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We introduce a new genera-
tor xn+1 and a new relator rk+1 = x
−1
n+1xixj. The group with the presentation
〈x1, ..., xn, xn+1; r1, ..., rk, rk+1〉 is obviously isomorphic to G. Now if we replace r1
with r′1 = xn+1u, then the presentation 〈x1, ..., xn, xn+1; r
′
1, ..., rk , rk+1〉 will again de-
fine a group isomorphic to G, but now the length of one of the defining relations (r1)
has decreased by 1. Continuing in this manner, we can eventually obtain a presentation
where all relators have length at most 3, at the expense of introducing more generators.
Apparently, relators of length at most 3 can provide a very good diffusion, but the
natural question now is: why cannot the opponent convert the new presentation back
to the original one and take it from there? This, indeed, may work with some of the
protocols, but let us have a look at the situation where applying an endomorphism of
a group to an element is involved.
Suppose a group G′ is isomorphic to a group G in the way described above. Let
w′ ∈ G′, and let ϕ be an endomorphism of G′ applied to w′. The opponent can convert
w′ and ϕ(w′) to elements w and u, respectively, of the group G, by using relations of
the form xs = x
±1
i1
x±1i2 , where xs are “new” generators and xi1 , xi2 are “old” generators.
Then the opponent may try to find an endomorphism ψ of G such that u = ψ(w) as
follows.
Suppose we know that ϕ takes generators x′i of the group G
′ to some y′i. An obvious
way to “lift” ϕ to an endomorphism of G would be to convert y′i to yi ∈ G (again, by
using relations of the form xs = x
±1
i1
x±1i2 ), then let ψ be the mapping of G that takes
xi to yi.
This however may not work (and typically will not work) because the endomorphism
ϕ, restricted to the “old” generators (i.e., to the generators of G) may not respect the
original relations of the group G. We can therefore have an element u ∈ G such that
ψ(w) = u in the group G, but ϕ(w′) 6= u in the group G′.
The only way to properly “lift” ϕ to an endomorphism of G would be to combine
it with an isomorphism f : G′ → G, but the latter is by no means easy to explicitly
compute, even if the whole chain of Tietze transformations is known to the opponent,
which does not have to be the case. Incidentally, neither has the original group G to
be known to the public.
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